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With its ever-increasing reliance upon computers and networks in all facets of 
operation and administration, the U.S. military is becoming increasingly vulnerable to 
computer and network-based threats. Military technicians’ ability to prevent and mitigate 
these threats is a skill that must be learned and practiced; for this reason, the Malicious 
Activities Simulation Tool (MAST) was created. 
The ongoing training required to defend networks and ensure DOD network 
policies are implemented correctly is costly and time consuming. A solution was needed 
to facilitate training system operators and administrators in potentially inauspicious 
environments, and to be adaptable to emerging threats. Since the proposed solution is on 
local systems with communication traveling over untrusted networks, a defense in depth 
plan ensures no undue consequences occur during MAST use. 
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With its ever-increasing reliance upon computers and networks in all facets of 
operation and administration, the Department of Defense (DOD) is becoming 
increasingly vulnerable to computer and network-based threats. Network operators and 
administrators’ ability to prevent and mitigate these threats is a skill that must be learned 
and practiced; for this reason, the Malicious Activities Simulation Tool (MAST) was 
created. 
The ongoing training required to defend networks and ensure DOD network 
policies are implemented correctly is costly and time consuming. A solution is needed to 
facilitate training technicians and administrators in potentially inauspicious 
environments, and to be adaptable to emerging threats.  
Autonomous training and evaluating is needed due to a deficit in evaluation of 
personnel and resources in general. The training required to maintain a level of 
proficiency commensurate with the capabilities of current and potential adversaries is 
more than the Navy and the DOD can afford to allocate in a time of significant fiscal 
constraints. The need is recognized for an ability to conduct economical and timely on-
the-job training. Thus, MAST is created to provide the opportunity for services to train on 
the very networks they are responsible for operating [1]. 
Currently, MAST uses a tiered approach to operations. There is a master server, 
called the MAST Scenario Generation Server (SG), where training scenarios are created, 
signed, and distributed. 
The next layer of MAST is the Scenario Execution Server (SE); this is the focal 
point for many functions of the overall MAST architecture and contains the majority of 
MAST’s complexity and code. The SE communicates directly with the SG as well as the 
End Nodes (EN) for a particular scenario. It is the server that executes a given scenario 
and, as such, is responsible for all command and control functions of that scenario.  
The final layer of MAST is the EN; this is the service running on each 
participating client computer on the network being evaluated or for which the 
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administrators are being trained. The MAST EN is the program that enables the SE to 
interact with the end computer and user during the scenario. Additionally, it provides 
relevant information back to the SE. 
MAST has been in a continual state of development since its inception almost 
four years ago. Much work has been done on the MAST prototype to enable it to 
participate in real-world exercises as a proof of concept. As MAST matures and moves 
towards becoming possibly a program of record, there must be a concerted effort to 
document improvements and progress toward final acceptance as a program of record. 
MAST was evaluated using the DOD Risk Management Framework (RMF) by 
Brian Diana in 2015[1] and was found substantially lacking in several critical areas. 
These problems are examined in detail in Chapter III.  
A. THESIS OBJECTIVE 
MAST currently communicates in the clear, potentially over untrusted networks, 
and lacks validation of where, or from whom, any communication originates. This issue 
was addressed in Diana’s thesis [1]. This thesis increases MAST’s level of security and 
assurance by addressing several of the problems identified by Diana without sacrificing 
functionality or ease of use.  
The focus of this thesis is the correction of security issues identified in [1], these 
issues relate to confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation and authentication. 
As an academic prototype rather than a product developmental program, MAST was 
inadequately prepared for the DOD RMF; nevertheless, it was assessed for viability as a 
program to be offered to the DOD. This thesis evaluates methods to correct seven of the 
security deficiencies identified in [1], mainly focusing on confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, non-repudiation, and authentication. Furthermore, it implements the 
proposed solutions to the greatest extent possible to bring MAST closer to becoming a 
viable option for the DOD to offer on-the-job training for system administrators and 
commanders of forces in both the cyber realm and the operational environment.   
 3 
B. METHODOLOGY 
There have been many improvements to security on the Internet in recent years.  
Many libraries have been created to facilitate the implementation of secure 
communications over insecure channels. One such method is the use of digital signatures 
whenever sending information between two end-points that might have to traverse 
untrusted network paths. Another method is to utilize a secure application-level 
connection, such as the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocols, which have progressed to 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols. These approaches are not mutually exclusive 
and provide their own strengths and weaknesses. This thesis employs both methods in 
concert to provide defense in depth.  
The core modules of MAST are implemented in Java and thus allow for the use of 
the Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA), enabling the use of digital signatures and the 
creation of TLS/SSL connections. Once these additions have been implemented, they 
must be thoroughly verified and validated, the details of which are discussed in Chapter 
IV. Our testing included penetration testing, man in the middle attacks, and 
unauthorized/malicious transmissions.  
C. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis is organized into five chapters. The first two chapters provide a 
background of MAST and encrypted communications. Chapter III evaluates the specific 
deficiencies of MAST that this thesis aims to correct, the status-quo solutions to such 
problems, and the chosen implementations. Chapter IV covers the testing of the 
implementations that are discussed in Chapter III. Finally, Chapter V concludes the thesis 
with a summary of how well the solutions addressed the deficiencies addressed in 
Chapter III, along with possible ways to continue to improve MAST. 
  
 4 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 5 
II. BACKGROUND 
A lack of secure communication in MAST is an issue that needs to be addressed 
for MAST to continue developing and re-enter the DOD RMF. Chapter III reviews more 
in depth of what exactly the secure communication issues are currently in MAST. This 
chapter provides technical background for the proposed solution presented in Chapter III. 
Commonly held assumptions about encrypted communication are that there are three 
main pillars to it: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability [2]. Recently there have 
been two derived additions to these pillars; those are authenticity and non-repudiation. 
This chapter explores how these three major pillars and two derived pillars interact and 
ensure that only the intended recipients are the ones to know the content of the 
communications. 
A. CONFIDENTIALITY 
Confidentiality is important to encrypted communication because people want to 
ensure that what is being said between them is not intercepted by anyone. The 
confidentiality of communication is achieved by encryption. This section discusses the 
methods for that encryption, either symmetric encryption or asymmetric encryption, and 
the strengths and limitations of each type of encryption. 
Encryption plays a major role in the ability for someone to hide the contents of a 
message from prying eyes. Throughout the ages encryption has been evolving from the 
simplest forms to more complex and elaborate. Encryption revolves around the Kerckhoff 
principle: the encryption scheme must depend only on the secrecy of the key and not on 
the method of encryption [3]. The two types of encryption are symmetric and 
asymmetric. 
1. Symmetric Encryption 
Symmetric encryption is a very secure method of encryption when done correctly 
but it is not without its shortcomings. The basic necessity of symmetric encryption is that 
both the sender and receiver have the same key for the decryption. This is both the 
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strength and weakness of symmetric encryption; only those who have the key should be 
able to decrypt the messages but how does the key get to those people that need it? 
(1) Mono-Alphabetic Substitution 
One of the earliest forms of encryption dates back to the time of Julius Caesar and 
is thus named after the famed leader. The Caesar cypher is a substitution encryption 
where the original letter is replaced, or substituted, with a different letter so that the 
original word is unrecognizable. The substitution is with another letter of the same 
alphabet for the Caesar cypher, the alphabet is rotated by a set number of places, N, and 
then wrapped around. Table 1 shows how this would work using the English alphabet; on 
top is the normal alphabet and underneath is the shifted alphabet using N = 3, that is, a 
circular shift of three places. 
Table 1.   Caesar Cypher 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 
X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W 
 
The Caesar cypher is a prime example of a mono-alphabetic cypher and how 
different variants of the cypher can make it more difficult to decrypt. While there are only 
25 different possible shifts that could be used for N in the basic English alphabet, if a 
person allowed for any permutation of the alphabet for the original substitution, that is 
not being limited to simple circular rotations, then there are a possibility of over 
400,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000, or 26-factorial, different possible combinations 
that someone might have to try in order to decode the encrypted message without the 
proper key [4].  
For a time, this was a very successful method of encoding communications; 
however, eventually an easy way to decode the message without the decoding key was 
developed. This method used analysis of texts to find the most frequently occurring 
letters in a language and use that information to decipher the encrypted message. An 
example of this would be to examine the English language and find that the letter E is the 
most frequent letter, appearing 12.6 percent of the time [4]. Knowing the frequency of the 
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letters one can find the most frequently appearing letter in the encoded message and start 
replacing with the original letters. This method of breaking the encryption forced 
development of a more secure way to encode. 
(2) Poly-Alphabetic Substitution 
A second form of symmetric encryption is a poly-alphabetic substitution cypher. 
As the name implies, this new form of substitution cypher uses more than one alphabet to 
encode the message. An Italian architect, Leon Battista Alberti, first used poly-alphabetic 
substitution in the middle of the fifteenth century for encryption [4]. However, the first 
real implementation of this theory of encryption was not used until a French man by the 
name of Blaise de Vigenère devised a method to use it. The final method that was 
developed was to use twenty-six different shifts of the alphabet so that a reference table 
was produced as seen in Table 2. 
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Table 2.   Vigenère Table, from [4]   a b c D e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z 1 B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A 2 C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B 3 D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C 4 E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D 5 F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E 6 G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F 7 H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G 8 I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H 9 J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I 10 K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J 11 L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K 12 M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L 13 N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M 14 O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 15 P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O 16 Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P 17 R S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q 18 S T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R 19 T U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S 20 U V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T 21 V W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U 22 W X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V 23 X Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W 24 Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X 25 Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y 26 A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 
 
The manner in which this encryption method worked was to choose a key word; 
for this example the keyword is THESIS and the plaintext message is “what a great work 
was written.” The key word is repeatedly written over the plaintext message until their 
lengths are the same, then the first letter of the keyword is used to find the line to use for 
the shifted cipher for that letter. The plaintext letter is found on that line and the letter 
where the two lines intersect is used as the substitution. This example is seen in Figure 1; 
by taking the first letter of the plaintext, “w,” and intersecting the column with the row 




T H E S I S T H E S I S T H E S I S T H E S I S w h a t a g r e a t w o r k w a s w r i t t e n P O E L I Y K L E L A G K R A S A O K P X L M F 
Figure 1.  Vigenère Cipher Example 
Figure 1 shows the strength of the poly-alphabetic encryption because the same 
letter ‘w’ that appears four different times in the plaintext has a different letter substituted 
each time. This protects the plaintext from the language analysis that could easily break 
the mono-alphabetic cipher. However, after taking a closer look, if the encrypted text is 
long enough then a more complicated analysis can be performed. Too in depth for this 
thesis is how exactly the analysis is performed; but the encrypted text can be broken 
down into multiple different mono-alphabetic ciphers that can then be frequency 
analyzed to break the encryption. 
(3) Transposition 
Another method of hiding the content of a message is to simply transport some of 
the letters into different positions with an order to it so that the intended recipient can 
decrypt it. There are numerous different forms of transposition ciphers to include: rail, 
route, and columnar or keyed. All of these methods use the movement of the plaintext 
message to encode the content. The strength of the transposition cipher is that it provides 
security through obscurity. The message is hidden in plain sight and just looks like 
garbled text. Anyone trying to decipher the text will think it is either a mono-alphabetic 
or poly-alphabetic substitution. 
An example of the rail transposition is shown in Figure 2. Using the same text as 



















































Figure 2.  Rail Transposition 
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Figure 3.  Rail Transposition Encrypted Message 
The strength of the transposition cipher is also its greatest weakness. The message 
is in plain sight and once an analysis realizes that a substitution is not being used, the 
analysis can turn toward transposition. Focusing on transposition, an analysis can be 
conducted by simple rearrangement of the letters to find anagrams that sense of the 
message. The simplest way to avoid the plain sight vulnerability of the transposition is to 
use a combination of a poly-alphabetic substitution in conjunction with a transposition. 
This would play to the strength of both forms of encryption and also alleviate most of the 
weaknesses of both as well. The frequency analysis used against a substitution is made 
more difficult by the letters being rearranged within the message by the transposition 
cipher. The combination of the two methods does not mean that the message is perfectly 
protected; it just means that the message is harder to break. 
(4) Block Cypher 
As the name implies, a block cypher takes a fixed size of data, a block, and 
encrypts it to the same size block of encrypted text. A block cypher also requires a key 
for the encryption and decryption to take place. Typically, the block size for this type of 
encryption is either 128 bits or 256 bits (16 or 32 bytes/characters), if the data that needs 
to be encrypted does not fit into a standard block size it will be padded to fit. 
Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
Data Encryption Standard (DES) was the standard of encryption for a long time 
because of the method in which it would encrypt the data. There are 16 rounds for the 
DES system to work; each round will choose a sub-key from the original 56-bit key. DES 
splits the data into two streams, a left stream and a right stream, each 32 bits in length. 
The right stream is then expanded to 48-bits to be combined via the exclusive-or (XOR) 
operation with the 48 bits that were chosen from the 56-bit key. After the XOR operation 
 11 
the stream is put through a substitution table look-up that takes 6-bits at a time and turns 
it into 4 bits, thus going from 48 bits back to 32 bits. The new 32-bit chunk is then 
XOR’ed with the left stream 32 bits to become the new right chunk and the old right 
chunk becomes the new left chunk. This constitutes one round for the cipher; upon 
completion of all rounds of DES, the 32-bit chunks are then appended together to form 
the 64-bit block back together. This is illustrated in Figure 4 [5]. 
 12 
 
Figure 4.  DES Encryption, from [5] 
 13 
A problem with DES is that it has a small key size. Further, it is a slow process to 
create the encrypted data; this is because it will only work on a set of 64 bits or 8 bytes of 
data at a time. Another problem facing DES is the complementation property. As seen in 
[6], if there is a text, T, such that it was created using DES of a plaintext, P, and a key, K, 
then: 
 T = DES(P,K) 
Then also there is a bit-to-bit complement of T: 
 T’ = DES(P’,K’) 
If the original P is encrypted using all 255 keys K with a least significant bit being 
0 then a T’’ is created. After each T’’ is created, it can be compared with T and T’. If it 
matches T or T’ then the K or K’ that were used to generate T and T’, respectively, is 
most likely the key. While this does not arithmetically defeat DES, it does reduce the 
time taken to discover the key by half, by way of comparing a single T’’ to two key 
values K and K’ the work load is reduced. 
a. Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) 
An improvement to DES was to make the process more secure by having the 
process run three times with either two keys or three keys. This makes the process more 
secure and harder to break; but it also takes an already slow process and makes it three 
times slower. Another improvement over DES is the increase of key size for 3DES from 
a 64-bit key size to yield a 56-bit key to either 128-bits or 192-bits key size to yield two 
or three, respectively, 56-bit key chunks resulting in a 112-bit or 168-bit key. These 
improvements have helped strengthen the DES encryption but some of the weaknesses 
from DES are carried over to 3DES. These weaknesses include the complementary 
property, as well as if a 0-key, a zero for the entire key, is used for the process. A 0-key 
would make all of the three keys the same and thus making 3DES the exact same as DES 
and thereby making no improvement over DES. 
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b. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
The shortcomings of DES and 3DES were enough for a need to have another 
encryption process created and the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) challenged academia to create something better. There were five finalists and of 
those five, Rijndael was selected to become AES [3]. The way that AES works is similar 
to DES with XOR, shifting, and substitution-mapping but different enough that it is better 
because the bits come out of the substitution mapping and then are shifted before going 
into the mix column; this helps alleviate the complement problems of DES. The start of 
AES is similar to DES in that there is substitution of bytes in the chunk. After the 
substitution takes place the rows of the chunks are shifted and then the subsequent 
columns are mixed around and finally the key is applied into the chunks. All of this 
together creates one round of AES. Multiple rounds are needed for AES to be complete. 
A single round of AES is illustrated in Figure 5. This figure starts at the top with breaking 
the data into 16 blocks to be fed into the substitution mapping. When the substitution is 
complete those bits are fed into the mix column. The AES mix column is similar to DES 
in that the bits are separated and then XOR’ed with other halves of different substitution 
mappings. The same substitution mapping bits are used for all four rows of the mix 
column and then finally rejoined together before the key is applied and the bits are then 




Figure 5.  AES Encryption 
AES has no known weak keys or semi-weak keys [7]. AES is used throughout the 
IEEE 802.11 standard as an acceptable method for various encryption requirements as 
well as it is in use for IPSec [8], [9]. AES strengths will be discussed more in Chapter 
3 where the use of AES is shown in the implementation of Secure Socket Layer / 
Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS).  
(1) Block Ciphering Modes 
Since block ciphering takes a fixed block size and data is usually larger than that 
block size, a method had to be created to take the block size and use it to encrypt the 
larger amount of data. This section will cover two of the modes that have been used for 
block ciphers: Electronic Codebook and Cipher Block Chaining; there are more modes 
but they are beyond the scope of the thesis and these two are the more common modes 
used [3]. Both of these methods can use DES, 3DES, or AES. For the purposes of this 
thesis, the discussion will be based on the use of AES. 
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Electronic Codebook (ECB) 
This is the simplest and the weakest mode for block ciphering. For this mode of 
block ciphering, the data is broken into even sized blocks and encrypted as individual 
blocks. If the data does not evenly divide into blocks then padding is added to generate 
the last block for encrypting. Each block is encrypted independent of the other blocks 
with no influence on any of the other blocks being encrypted. While this makes the 
encryption faster it does not help if there are large portions of the data that are the same 
or if data is repeated. This can be seen in Figure 6, an ECB encryption of a picture of the 
Linux penguin. 
 
Figure 6.  ECB Encryption 
As can be seen in Figure 6, the picture can still be discerned. The encryption 
happened; however, since there was a lot of similar data and there was no change in how 
that data was encrypted the image changes a little but not completely. This is why ECB is 
not a very good mode of block ciphering. 
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Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) 
Where ECB had shortcomings and failures, Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) 
corrected them and is a good block mode to encrypt data. The concept is similar to ECB 
as the data is broken into blocks and padding is added if needed. The major difference 
between ECB and CBC is that CBC uses an initialization vector. The initialization vector 
is XORed with the first block of plaintext; the result is then is put through the block 
encryption. The output serves as the initialization vector for the next block of ciphering. 
This is illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.  Cipher Block Chaining Mode Encryption 
As can be seen in Figure 7, the problem becomes what to use as the initial vector 
for the first block of code. A few options are available for the first block of code: fixed, 
counter, random, and nonce-generated. The first option, a fixed initialization vector, is 
not a good one because similar blocks of data are always encrypted similarly. The second 
option of using a counter is almost as bad as the fixed option. The reason that the counter 
option is bad is because much real world data could start similarly and the counter could 
cancel any differences in the initial XOR causing the blocks to turn out similar enough to 
be susceptible to attack. The third option is to use a random initial vector. The random 
initialization vector is usually added to the message as the first cipher block so that the 
recipient will know the random initialization vector used to encrypt the text. This presents 
a problem for security because an attacker could intercept the data and try the first block 
as an initialization vector to decrypt the data thereby enabling a man-in-the-middle 
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attack. While combating the problem associated with ECB and a fixed or counter 
initialization vector, it tends to add a large amount of data to small data that needs to be 
encrypted if the original data to be send was small, such as a short message. The final 
option is to use a nonce, or number used once, as the initialization vector. This nonce is 
unique in that it is only used once with any key so as to make it more difficult to break by 
an advisory. When the message is sent the nonce must be encrypted and passed with the 
data, this does not add too much extra data to the message and is easily accomplished [3].  
2. Asymmetric Encryption
While symmetric encryption is a great tool to use for secure communication and 
data, it does have shortcomings. With symmetric encryption all parties that want to 
encrypt and decrypt the same message must have the same keys for the process to work 
correctly. This becomes a problem of scale when a large group of people or machines 
need the information that is being encrypted. Also a problem of key distribution arises 
because the keys must be distributed to the people or machines that require them, and 
doing so securely is difficult.  
A different method of providing confidentiality is to use asymmetric encryption. 
This method uses one key or keys to encrypt information and a different set to decrypt the 
information. This helps to solve the problem of all parties needing the same key for 
encryption and decryption. The problem of key compromise is addressed with 
asymmetric encryption, in that if the receiver’s key is compromised than little damage is 
done to the encrypted message. This will be explained further later in the chapter.  
Public key encryption is used synonymously with asymmetric encryption. Keys 
exist in pairs: a public key and a private key. A public key is a key that is available to 
anyone and everyone. The private key is beholden to the person for whom it was created 
to do the encryption or decryption. The two most widely known public key encryption 




Diffie-Hellman (D-H) is an easily explained secret key exchange between people. 
The strength of D-H is brought about through modulo math. There are private numbers 
that must be kept private and public numbers that must be exchanged between people and 
a way for all parties to agree on the secret number. D-H uses extremely large prime 
numbers; but for purposes of this explanation smaller numbers will be used and an 
assumption of an understanding of modulo math and prime numbers is made.  
Suppose two people, Rebecca and Heather, want to exchange secret muffin 
recipes and to do this they have to agree on a secret number to use for encrypting the 
recipes. To do so they have to tell each other the public numbers to use. They choose a 
prime number and a prime root modulo number of the prime number, 23 and 5 
respectively. Now each chooses a secret number known only to herself: neither knows the 
other’s secret number. Rebecca chooses her secret number to be 8 and then sends Heather 
the value, R, which is: 
 R = 58 mod 23 = 16 
Heather also does the same calculation with her secret number, which she chose 
as 13: 
 H = 513 mod 23 = 21 
Rebecca sent the number 16 to Heather; who in turn sends Rebecca the number 
21. With these two numbers, Rebecca and Heather now have the knowledge to access 
their shared secret number. Rebecca achieves the secret number by calculating it: 
 Secret = 218 mod 23 = 3 
Heather does the same calculation with the number sent to her from Rebecca. 
 Secret = 1613 mod 23 = 3 
Now Rebecca and Heather have a number that is only known by the two of them. 
This is asymmetric because anyone can know the prime number and the prime root 
modulo number; but without knowing the secret number for Rebecca and Heather there is 
a very small chance that the secret number could be discerned by an attacker. 
Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA) 
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While the D-H key exchange is good for getting a secret number or key to 
different people, the data or message being sent is not encrypted. For this purpose a form 
of encryption must be used and one was created that used asymmetric keys to achieve 
encryption without the need for everyone to have the same keys. Rivest, Shamir, and 
Adleman devised a method that would let a person encrypt a message, or data, in a way 
that it can be sent to the recipient without the need for a key exchange [10]. A recipient 
would just publish a public key for anyone to use and then retain a private key for the 
decryption. Similar to the D-H key exchange, there are prime numbers and modulo math 
used, in conjunction with Euclid’s algorithm, and for the following example an 
understanding of each is assumed. Also like the previous example, smaller prime 
numbers will be used but the real RSA encryption uses much larger prime numbers ones 
that are up to 2048 bits in size. 
Rebecca and Heather still want to exchange muffin recipes but this time they want 
to encrypt the recipes and send them in one step instead of the two steps required with the 
D-H key exchange followed by encrypting.  
Rebecca picks two prime numbers, P1 and P2, which for this example shall be 
taken to be 7 and 13, respectively. These values are to remain secret and known only to 
Rebecca. She multiplies these two numbers together and publishes the product (P), with 
another number, E, as her public key. The value of E must be such that it is relatively 
prime to the value (P1-1)(P2-1), referred to as the Euler’s totient function [11]. These two 
numbers, P and E, are made known to anyone that wants to send Rebecca a message. 
Heather, knowing Rebecca’s public key, converts her recipe to a number, for the 
purposes of this example that number is 76 or M. In order to produce the encrypted text 
Heather runs her number through the equation: 
Encrypted Text (C) = ME mod P 
This will produce a number, in this example 20, that is then sent to Rebecca. 
Rebecca then uses her two private numbers and calculates the decryption key, D. This is 
done by using the modulo multiplicative inverse of E and P such that: 
E x D = 1 mod (P1-1)*(P2-1) 
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The result for this example is that D is equal to 5. Thus, D replaces E in the 
original equation just like C replaces M. The decryption equation looks similar to the 
encryption equations but with the substitutions: 
Decrypted Text (M) = CD mod P 
After all the substitution and math is worked out, Rebecca would arrive at having 
the same number for M as Heather had sent [4]. So long as Rebecca does not reveal her 
secret numbers, anyone can send an encrypted message to Rebecca and she should be the 
only person who can decrypt it. This is the strength of RSA encryption. 
B. INTEGRITY 
Integrity is a pillar of secure communication because the people sending data to 
each other need to be able to rely on the fact that the message is received exactly as it was 
sent. The easiest way to think about integrity is to remember the childhood game of 
telephone, where children would sit in a line and at one end the first child would whisper 
a “secret” sentence into the ear of the child next to him. The sentence would be repeated 
from one child to the next until the last child in the line would say what she had heard 
from her neighbor and it would be compared to the original sentence; rarely did the two 
sentences match. While this is funny in a party environment it takes a turn for the worse 
if the original message was, “Do not attack at dawn” and the message received was 
“Attack at dusk” or possibly “Do attack at dawn.” In the following paragraphs threats to 
integrity and possible protection against these threats will be discussed.  
1. Threats to Integrity
Two common forms of threats to integrity exist: manipulation of data and the 
corruption of data. This section examines these two different threats to integrity and how 
the two could occur in the real world. 
Manipulation 
The example just provided, the message “Attack at dusk,” is an example of the 
message being manipulated while in transit. Manipulation is the willful changing of the 
contents of the message so that a different result is achieved when the recipient receives 
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the message. The manipulation could be subtle or substantial but if the manipulation is 
undetected, it is successful. 
Corruption 
“Do attack at dawn” may be considered an example of simple corruption of the 
original message, assuming the individual passing it on had simply failed to hear the 
word “not.” This corruption is unintended changing of the message that happens because 
of transfer methods of the message or data. Corruption could happen because of a power 
surge along the lines of communication, a lightning strike, a simple data corruption on the 
storage medium, or wind shifts that affect the swaying of tree branches in a wireless 
environment. The method of corruption is not important; detecting the corruption, and 
correcting it when possible, is. 
2. Protection of Integrity 
While there are intended and unintended forms of integrity violations, there are a 
few different ways to help protect data from such violations. Two methods reviewed in 
this thesis are hash functions and parity code. These methods will not indicate what the 
manipulation is or where the corruption occurred; rather they just help with the ability to 
detect that there was manipulation or that corruption had happened. 
a. Parity Check 
A simple error check for integrity is the parity check. This could be either odd 
parity or even parity, which means that a bit is appended to the set of all bits in the data 




Table 3.   Odd Parity Check 
Original Data Parity Bit Modified Data Detection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Yes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Yes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 Yes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 No 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 Yes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 No 
 
Table 3 shows an odd parity for an eight-bit data stream. The ninth bit is added so 
that the sum of the stream is made odd. So long as no even number of bits are corrupted 
or changed than the parity check does not fail. Various means exist to produce a more 
complex parity check such that the likelihood of detecting changes in the “checked” data 
is more probable. Another easy way to check for corruption or manipulation is to use a 
hash function. 
b. Hash Function 
A hash function takes any size of data and converts it to a fixed-size amount of 
data, usually between 128–1024 bits. This means if a hash function is of 128 bits in size it 
will take any size of data and manipulate it until it is represented by a 128-bit block. In 
the extreme, if the data is 1 bit long than it will manipulate the data in a manner that it 
will produce 128 bits for the hash value. Similarly, if the data were a Gigabyte of data the 
same hash function would manipulate the data in such a way that still only a 128-bit 
block of data would be produced.  
The strength of this technique is that a hash function could produce a random 
mapping of the original data to the hash value produced. A good hash value will have 
high collision resistance; that is, it would be highly unlikely that two different blocks of 
data would create the same hash value for a given function. This random mapping and 
collision resistance make hashing a good way to help protect the integrity of data; that is 
a small change, of even one bit, in the original message could cause a large change in the 
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hash value and the change would be detected. The randomness of the mapping ensures 
that given just a hash value, the original data could not be recovered or reverse 
engineered.  
Two different hash functions are the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) and the 
Message Digest (MD) algorithm. MD5 is the current iteration of the message digest 
algorithm for creating hash functions and is currently not recommended for use in secure 
communication [4], although this recommendation is not heeded by many as MD5 is still 
available for use on websites to verify the integrity of downloads and content. SHA has 
many different forms, starting with SHA (SHA-0) and progressing through SHA-1, SHA-
224, SHA-256, and SHA-384 to SHA-512. These numbers for the most part represent the 
size of the hash value and thus there is a SHA for sizes 160, 224, 256, 384, and 512 bits. 
Whereas MD5 is only 128 bits, SHA was able to adapt and evolve to accommodate larger 
hash values and remain relevant to secure communication. This is why the SHA family is 
the only hash functions recommended by the National Institute of Science and 
Technology (NIST) [12]. The exact methodology of how the hash function creates the 
residual value is beyond the scope of this thesis. Table 4 shows the different SHA values 
for an empty text document, string = ““ or empty, and the SHA values for a text 
document that only contains a single blank character, string = 0x08 (in hexadecimal).  
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Table 4.   SHA Values 
Function Value (String = ““) Value (String = “ “) SHA (SHA-0) (20 bytes) f96cea198ad1dd5617ac084a3d92c6107708c0ef 92847a9f8c36a92affc65e9bfb4eb4f851b50dad SHA-1 (20 bytes) da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709 e5fa44f2b31c1fb553b6021e7360d07d5d91ff5e SHA-224 (28 bytes) d14a028c2a3a2bc9476102bb288234c415a2b01f828ea62ac5b3e42f b265f33f6fe99bd366dae49c45d2c3d288fdd852024103e85c07002d SHA-256 (32 bytes) e3b0c44298fc1c149afbf4c8996fb92427ae41e4649b934ca495991b7852b855 4355a46b19d348dc2f57c046f8ef63d4538ebb936000f3c9ee954a27460dd865 
SHA-384 (48 bytes) 
38b060a751ac96384cd9327eb1b1e36a21fdb71114be07434c0cc7bf63f6e1da274edebfe76f65fbd51ad2f14898b95b 
d654902b550e334bb6898d5c4ab8ebe1aedc6c85368eafe28e0f89b62a74a23e1ed20abbc10c02ce321266384d444717 




These two columns illustrate the vast difference in hash values just from a single 
character being added to a document and then re-hashed.   
C. AVAILABILITY 
Availability is the simplest of the pillars to describe. Either something is available 
or it is not. This could be a physical restriction in that something was physically removed 
or denied to a user, or indirectly, such as someone denying power to a building where the 
users were trying to access the computers. While there are many different ways for 
something to become unavailable, especially in the digital realm, there are too many to 
discuss within the scope of this thesis. For the purposes of this thesis, availability will 
refer to whether something is accessible or not. If a resource is accessible than it is 
available and if it is not accessible than it is not available.  
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D. AUTHENTICATION AND NON-REPUDIATION 
Given the triangle for digital security consists of confidentiality, integrity, and 
authentication, when two or more of these are combined a new pillar is formed. When 
confidentiality and integrity are combined new pillars of authentication and non-
repudiation are created. The use of a hash function value appended to the message creates 
a message authentication code; when RSA encryption is used in conjunction with a hash 
function digital signatures are created. 
1. Message Authentication Code 
A message authentication code (MAC) uses a keyed cipher block chaining 
encryption method to generate a one of a kind authentication code that is attached to the 
original message and sent with the original message to the recipient. The recipient then 
goes through the same steps with the received message to generate his own MAC and 
compares it to the MAC that was sent with the original message. If the MAC generated is 
equal to the MAC sent then the message was not changed in route to the recipient and the 
recipient knows that only someone with the MAC-key could have generated the MAC 
and sent the message. 
2. Digital Signatures 
Similar to a message authentication code, a digital signature adds a refinement to 
the list of people that could have sent a message or data. With a MAC, anyone that has 
access to the MAC-key could have generated the message but with a digital signature 
there is only one person that could have created the signature and this results in non-
repudiation being added to the authentication of a message or data; that is, the ability to 
prevent the originator of a message to later retract or repudiate having sent the message.  
The generation of a digital signature is similar to the generation of a MAC. The 
message is hashed, using one of the approved hash functions previously mentioned, and 
then the hash value is encrypted using the sender’s private key, which was formulated 
using the RSA encryption previously discussed. This encrypted hash value is attached to 
the message and then the message is encrypted with the recipient’s public key and sent to 
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the recipient. The recipient uses her private key to decrypt the message, thus preventing 
anyone else from decrypting it and modifying the message en route, and the public key of 
the sender to decrypt the hash value sent within the signature, thus ensuring only the 
originator could have generated the hash. The recipient hashes the original message sent 
and compares that hash value to the hash value that was decrypted. If the two match then 
the message is authentic and the person whose public key was used to encrypt the 
signature could only have sent it, so there is non-repudiation. Figure 8 shows an example 
of how this would work. 
 
Figure 8.  Digital Signature Example 
This provides confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation for the 
message. 
Similar to digital signatures there is also Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI), which is 
more of an extension of or implementation of digital signatures on a large scale. PKI 
handles the key exchange for the digital signatures as well as has the ability to have a 
trusted agent verify that a signature is authentic. The way that the signature is 
authenticated is by using a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) to host the public keys of 
supported entities. For example, a user, Rebecca, generates a key pair and stores the 
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private key but sends the public key to the CA. The CA then issues a certificate stating 
that the public key belongs to Rebecca and this is included when Rebecca sends her 
public key to Heather so that Heather has a reassurance that the public key that she 
received is actually Rebecca’s. PKI uses X.509 as its standard for identification purposes 
and authentication of user submitted keys [13].  
X.509 
X.509 is the standard for generating a certificate from the CA to be used in the 
PKI system [13]. This standard tells about the user that is providing the certificate as well 
as how the CA generated the certificate. There are three fields to X.509 entities: the 
Certificate, Certificate Signature Algorithm and the Certificate Signature. The Certificate 
is comprised of 10 subfields. Those subfields are as follows for a X.509 version 3 
certificate. 
(1) Version 
This describes what version of X.509 the certificate meets. There are three 
versions of the certificate, versions 1, 2, and 3; with 3 being the most current [14]. 
(2) Serial Number 
This is a unique positive integer assigned by the CA to each individual certificate 
and no two certificates should have the same serial number [14]. 
(3) Algorithm ID 
The algorithm used to sign the certificate is named in this section and this must 
match the algorithm named in the Certificate Signature Algorithm [14]. 
(4) Issuer 
The Issuer is the name of the CA or person that is providing the certificate. The 
certificate can be self-signed, meaning that the user who created the public key is also the 
one who created the certificate and no outside entity verified the public key. This is 
covered in Chapter III [14]. 
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(5) Validity 
The CA puts the expiration date of the certificate in this field. This helps with 
revocation of any certificates and ensures that users have the most up-to-date certificates 
for security purposes [14]. 
(6) Subject 
The user associated with the public key is named in this section [14]. 
(7) Subject Public Key Information 
The type of key (RSA, DSA, or D-H) as well as the actual public key is located in 
this section [14]. 
(8) Unique Identifiers 
This is used in the case that the Subject or issuer names have to be reused over 
time [14]. 
(9) Extensions 
This section allows for a certification hierarchy [14]. A certification hierarchy is a 
list of trusted Subjects that allow for unknown users to trust a certificate and the public 
key. Keeping with the example of Rebecca and Heather, a certification hierarchy could 
be that Rebecca tells Heather to trust a public key from Denise even though Heather does 
not know Denise. Heather trusts Rebecca and Rebecca trusts Denise; thus, a hierarchy of 
trust is created, also referred to as transitive trust. 
The Certificate Signature Algorithm field contains the algorithm used to sign the 
certificate by the CA [14]. The Certificate Signature is the value of the certificate using 
the Certificate Signature Algorithm. The recipient uses this to verify the integrity of a 
received certificate.  
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E. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the core concepts of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, 
along with the derived concepts of authentication and non-repudiation were explained. 
Ways in which to ensure that these pillars of secure communication are afforded and 
enacted were also covered. Chapter III covers how MAST is lacking in these areas and 
how the correction of these areas is addressed by incorporating different libraries of code 




As highlighted in [1], MAST is deficient in encryption and secure 
communication. This presents a problem for the use of MAST on the DOD computer 
systems and networks. This chapter examines some of the network centric issues of 
MAST. 
A. SECURITY ISSUES OF MAST 
For a more in depth discussion of the issues described herein, refer to [1]. This 
thesis will address the issues included in Table 5 that is extracted from [1] and included 
here for ease of reference; it is from the development findings in [1]. This section of [1] 
has 42 of the 77 identified issues in MAST. The table is divided into three columns: the 
severity of the issue, the portion of the STIG that is applicable, and a detail of the 
requirement and how MAST fails to meet the requirement. Per [1], the severity of a 
finding is divided into high, medium, and low. A high severity is any vulnerability the 
exploitation of which will directly and immediately results in loss of confidentiality, 
availability, or integrity. A medium severity is any vulnerability the exploitation of which 
has a potential to result in loss of confidentiality, availability, or integrity. A low severity 
is any vulnerability, the existence of which degrades measures to protect against loss of 
confidentiality, availability, or integrity.   
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Table 5.   ASD STIG Findings, from [1] 
STIG ID Severity Requirement from ASD 
STIG 
Finding Details from SCA 
APP3250 High 
The designer will ensure data transmitted through a commercial or wireless network is protected using an appropriate form of cryptography. 
Encryption is not used by the application. 
APP3150 Medium 
The designer will ensure the application uses the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140–2 validated cryptographic modules and random number generator if the application implements encryption, key exchange, digital signature, and hash functionality. 
Encryption is not used by the application. 
APP3170 Medium 
The designer will ensure the application uses encryption to implement key exchange and authenticate endpoints prior to establishing a communication channel for key exchange. 
Encryption is not used by the application. 
APP3260 Medium 
The designer will ensure the application uses mechanisms assuring the integrity of all transmitted information (including labels and security parameters). 
Application does not use any kind of integrity mechanism. 
APP3300 Medium 
The designer will ensure applications requiring server authentication are PK-enabled. 
Application does not have server authentication mechanism. Lack of capability is a finding. PKI waiver required to continue without PKI enabled. 
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STIG ID Severity Requirement from ASD 
STIG 
Finding Details from SCA 
APP3700 Medium 
The designer will ensure unsigned Category 1A mobile code is not used in the application in accordance with DOD policy. 
Application’s SIMware modules contain various forms of mobile code, which are unsigned. 
APP3710 Medium 
The designer will ensure signed Category 1A and Category 2 mobile code signature is validated before executing 
Application performs no validation of mobile code. 
Seven vulnerabilities, as highlighted in Table 5, are addressed in this chapter with 
a combination of proposed solutions to solve the issues mentioned in [1]. 
B. DIGITAL SIGNATURES 
Using digital signatures is the first layer of a proposed defense-in-depth plan for 
MAST. As discussed in Chapter II, a digital signature allows for authentication and non-
repudiation of data. The proposed solution for digital signatures in support of MAST’s 
defense-in-depth plan leverages java’s security package [15], specifically the portion of 
the security package that handles access control, such as key pair generation, private key 
generation, public key generation, and random number generator. This would be used for 
communication between the MAST SG Server, SE Server, Graphical User Interface, and 
the clients or ENs. The code fragments in this section are included to help understand 
concepts and do not directly correlate to the actual code used in MAST; they are intended 
for explanatory and illustrative purposes only. 
1. Digital Signatures
The digital signatures generator in the java security package generates signatures 
in accordance with the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), RSA digital signature 
algorithm, and the Elliptical Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). The proposed 
solution uses the java methods to create a public and private key for each of the 
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components of MAST and store the keys in a key store that is accessible by all the 
components.  
a. Key Generation
Java accomplishes the generation of keys via its security library. The library must 
be imported before the functionality can be used: 
import java.security.*; 
This command will import every method that is contained within the security 
library. Once the security library is imported, access is granted to methods that are 
required to create the keys for each part of the MAST system. The generation of the keys 
is simple in coding terms but a lot of work is done by the library routines. 
KeyPairGenerator keyGen = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance (“ECDSA”); 
Here keyGen is created as an instance of KeyPairGenerator using the RSA standard 
and the key generation algorithms that are proprietary to Sun Microsystem (now Oracle, 
Inc.). There is a list of different providers that could be used for the KeyPairGenerator in 
[16]. After the instance of the KeyPairGenerator is created, a random number must be used 
to seed the key. Getting an instance of the SecureRandom method generates the random 
number. 
SecureRandom random = SecureRandom.getInstance(“SHA1PRNG,” “SUN”); 
The SecureRandom instance random meets the FIPS 140–2 requirements for 
randomness [17], specifically called out in Section 4.9.1. The next step is to initialize the 
key generator with the random number that was just generated. 
keyGen.initialize(1024, random); 
Here the KeyPairGenerator instance, keyGen, calls the class method, initialize, 
which instantiates the keyGen with the key size and the random number for the keys. The 
KeyPair class in the Security library stores the public and private keys generated by the 
KeyPairGenerator. The KeyPair instance is created using the generateKeyPair method 
from the keyGen created above. The use of “SG” in the naming of the key instances is to 
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make it explicitly clear that these keys are associated with the Scenario Generation 
server. Similar naming conventions will be used for the other MAST entities. 
 KeyPair pairSG = keyGen.generateKeyPair(); 
 PrivateKey privSG = pairSG.getPrivate(); 
 PublicKey pubSG = pairSG.getPublic() 
The next part of digital signatures is to use the keys once they have been created. 
The proposed solution generates the keys for all components involved, the Scenario 
Generation Server (SG), the Scenario Execution Server (SE), and the client or End Node 
(EN). The public keys that are generated for each component are stored on the 
corresponding component that will need the public key. This example provides a possible 
generation of the SG public and private key; the process can be repeated for the SE and 
all ENs that are needed. The component that is providing its signature will only need to 
use the private key of the key pair; continuing with this example, the SG associated keys 
will be used. The SG will create a signature: 
 Signature signSG = Signature.getInstance(“SHA512withECDSA,”);  
The Signature class of the Security Library again uses the designated algorithm 
and desired provider; the two must match the key type that was generated. Now the SG 
has an ECDSA signature algorithm to use when communicating with the SE. 
b. Using Signatures 
The signature instance must be modified each time data is to be certified by the 
signature. For this solution the messages will be sent into a byte-wise loop that takes each 
byte array read from the associated file and updates the signature instance accordingly. 
Note that the signature instance is initialized prior to the generation of the new signature. 
Upon complete processing of the intended message, the signature instance is finalized 
with the call to the signature method, sign(). 
signSG.initSign(privSG); 
FileInputStream SGfis = new FileInputStream(fileName); 
BufferedInputStream SGbufin = new BufferedInputStream(SGfis); 
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byte[] SGbuffer = new byte[1024]; 
    int len; 
    while ((len = SGbufin.read(SGbuffer)) >= 0) { 
      signSG.update(buffer, 0, len); 
    }; 
    SGbufin.close(); 
    byte[] realSig = signSG.sign(); 
The subject of the signature is fileName, which is the file that is going to be sent 
from the SG to the SE. This file is a new scenario file that is to be sent from the SG to the 
SE and for execution by SE. Now that the signature has been created, it will be attached 
to the associated data object that is to be sent between SG and SE. With the signature, SE 
will be able to verify that the integrity of the new scenario was not compromised during 
the communication with SE. 
c. Verifying Signatures 
The process for generating a signature must be completed by the recipient, using 
the data sent by the source (in this case the SG), to enable the recipient to validate the 
received data integrity. The same process will work for any component of MAST, so the 
communication between SG and SE is verified in the same manner as the communication 
between SE and EN.  
The receiver must have the public key of the sender in order to verify the 
signature. The acquisition of that key is discussed separately in the secure socket layer / 
transport layer section of this chapter. The first step in verifying the data integrity is to 
load the bytes of the data that was signed. Here it is assumed the recipient stored the 
received data (a serialized Java object) in a file, thus the file access methods of Java can 
be leveraged. 
      FileInputStream SEsigfis = new FileInputStream(fileName); 
      byte[] sigToVerify = new byte[SGsigfis.available()];  
      SEsigfis.read(sigToVerify ); 
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      SEsigfis.close(); 
Next the recipient must create a signature instance to be used to verify the 
integrity of the data received and associated with a digital signature. The instance must be 
initialized before use. 
Signature SEsig = Signature.getInstance(“ECDSA”); 
      SEsig.initVerify(SGpubKey); 
 Now the receiver has to take the message that was sent and generate its own 
version of the signature using the public key from the sender. This is accomplished in the 
same way that the sender created the initial signature using the sender’s private key. 
FileInputStream SEdatafis = new FileInputStream(fileName); 
      BufferedInputStream bufin = new BufferedInputStream(SEdatafis); 
      byte[] buffer = new byte[1024]; 
      int len; 
      while (bufin.available() != 0) { 
        len = bufin.read(buffer); 
        SEsig.update(buffer, 0, len); 
        }; 
bufin.close(); 
Finally, the last step is to compare the two signatures using the class method, 
verify(), which returns a Boolean variable indicating whether or not the data that was 
received is valid. If False is returned the recipient must discard the received data. Further 
action might include requesting a retransmission by the sender as well as alerting the user 
that there is a possible compromise of the network. The latter might be conditioned upon 
the receipt of multiple invalid signatures. 
boolean verifies = SEsig.verify(sigToVerify); 
 38 
2. DOD RMF Vulnerabilities Addressed through Digital Signatures 
The use of digital signatures helps to ensure that there is integrity throughout the 
system and that the message that is being sent has not been tampered with while en route 
between the two entities that are communicating. Since the digital signatures are only 
between the communicating portions of MAST and do not directly verify outside sources 
of code or communication and it does not use encryption, there is very little of the DOD 
RMF that is corrected by the addition of digital signatures alone. The two parts corrected 
are shown in Table 6. 
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Table 6.   DOD RMF Vulnerabilities Addressed by Digital Signatures, 
from [1] 
APP3700 Medium 
The designer will ensure unsigned Category 1A mobile code is not used in the application in accordance with DOD policy. 
Application’s SIMware modules contain various forms of mobile code, which are unsigned. 
APP3710 Medium 
The designer will ensure signed Category 1A and Category 2 mobile code signature is validated before executing 
Application performs no validation of mobile code. 
As Table 6 shows, the vulnerabilities of MAST with regard to validation are of 
medium severity. MAST should now be able to validate communication between 
components. Now that SG can upload and send a scenario to SE, the use of a digital 
signature becomes a critical requirement more so than before when this capability did not 
exist. The signing of the scenario by SG before sending and the verification of the 
scenario before using allows for MAST to address these two vulnerabilities as mentioned 
in [1]. The remaining problems addressed by the DOD RMF are handled by the addition 
of SSL to the system.  
C. SECURE SOCKET LAYER / TRANSPORT LAYER SECURITY 
TLS is used to secure many different types of information transfers. Examples 
include web browsing, financial transactions, healthcare transactions, Virtual Private 
Networks (VPNs), and custom protocols. It is a layered and application independent 
protocol, typically operating between layer 4 and 5 of the TCP/IP Stack. Its primary goal 
is to provide two communicating applications with privacy and data integrity [18], but it 
can be used in other ways, such as in VPNs, transactional systems and transfer protocols 
as mentioned above, where TLS is optionally offered at lower levels of the TCP/IP Stack. 
The SSL protocol was originally designed by the Netscape Corporation and used 
in a client-server relationship. SSL 1 was never officially released. SSL 2.0, however, 
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was officially released in February of 1995. Shortly thereafter, in 1996, SSL 3.0 was 
released due to known security flaws in SSL 2.0 and was subject to a complete redesign 
of the protocol. Though Netscape released SSL 3.0, it was historically documented in 
[19] because TLS 1.0 uses SSL 3.0 as a foundation.  
TLS 1.0, as defined by [20], builds upon the SSL 3.0 design, and can optionally 
negotiate to downgrade to SSL 3.0 for legacy interoperability. TLS 1.1, as defined in 
[21], was formalized in April 2006. It was released primarily in response to weaknesses 
in the initialization vector selection and padding error processing found in SSL 3.0 and 
TLS 1.0 [21]. While TLS 1.1 and 1.2 were minor changes to protocol policies, TLS 1.2 
added enhanced cryptographic modifications and many other improvements as specified 
in [18]. Of note is the transition from MD5/SHA-1 to SHA-256 in several components of 
the suite and the depreciation of cipher suites such as IDEA and DES. 
1. SSL/TLS Technical Components
TLS is not a simple stand-alone protocol. It is instead an aggregate of multiple 
sub-protocols and technologies described in greater detail below. Since the goal of TLS is 
to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability and since other tried and true 
technologies already exist to provide some proper subset of these characteristics, TLS 
implements an appropriate methodology of combining them. It leverages their strengths 
and account for their weaknesses with other sub-protocols and methodologies. The end 
product provides the desired security for communication.  
a. TLS Handshake
The Handshake is used to negotiate security parameters for the session. Since 
there are many different options for a particular TLS session, both hosts need to agree 
upon which cipher suite—key establishment, digital signature, confidentiality and 
integrity algorithms, etc.—will be used [22]. This portion of TLS has attracted the most 
attention, as it has been the primary vector of attack, typically involving downgrading to 
legacy cipher suites. The TLS Handshake is a combination of three components: 
handshake, change cipher spec, and alert. 
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(1) The Handshake (Hello) 
The TLS Handshake, specifically the “Hello” portion, is designed to negotiate 
session parameters (cipher suite). The client informs the server of the protocols and 
standards that it supports and then the server selects the highest common protocols and 
standards. Specifically, the Client Hello message specifies a supported cipher suite that is 
defined by a key exchange algorithm, a bulk encryption algorithm, a MAC algorithm, and 
a Pseudo Random Function (PRF) [18], MACs and PRFs are discussed later in this 
report. Once the server has selected a cipher suite, it informs the client through the 
Change Cipher Spec. 
(2) Change Cipher Spec 
The server notifies the client of the security parameters for the remainder of the 
session using the Change Cypher Spec protocol, as decided upon during the initial 
handshake. Once the client is in receipt of the server’s Change Cipher Spec message, it 
sends its own Change Cipher Spec message to acknowledge and confirm that it will 
continue with the selected parameters. The Finish messages are encrypted using the 
agreed upon security parameters and serve as an integrity check to the handshake. 
(3) Alerts 
Alerts are messages that convey errors and warnings such as unexpected message, 
record overflow, or bad certificate. Those that are considered “fatal” cause the immediate 
tear down of the session to prevent a compromise in security. 
b. Putting it All Together
The handshake is one of the most important, and as previously noted vulnerable, 
components of the overall TLS protocol. During the handshake, the two hosts (typically a 
server and a client) negotiate algorithms, cipher suites, symmetric keys, and other session 
parameters. 
Though the precise steps the handshake protocol executes will depend on the 
server and client configurations and compatibility, it can be generally viewed to follow 
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this procedure; a graphical representation of the TLS Handshake is depicted in Figure 9 
[23]. 
Figure 9.  Graphical Representation of a Typical TLS Handshake, from [23] 
The corresponding numbered list helps expand on what exactly is being explained 
in Figure 9 the numbers on the Client and Server sides of the figure relate to the numbers 







1. “Client Hello: The client sends a ClientHello message to which the server
must respond with a ServerHello message, or else a fatal error will occur
and the connection will fail. The ClientHello and ServerHello are used to
establish security enhancement capabilities between client and server. This
message exchange establishes the following attributes: Protocol Version,
Session ID, Cipher Suite, and Compression Method. Additionally, two
random values are generated and exchanged: ClientHello.random and
ServerHello.random.”[18]
2. Server HelloDone: “Following the hello messages, the server will send its
certificate in a Certificate message and the Server Key Exchange message
... If the server is authenticated, it may request a certificate from the client,
if that is appropriate to the cipher suite selected. Next, the server will send
the ServerHelloDone message, indicating that the hello-message phase of
the handshake is complete. The server will then wait for a client
response.” [18]
3. Optional Client Certificate: “If the server has sent a CertificateRequest
message, the client MUST send the Certificate message. The
ClientKeyExchange message is now sent, and the content of that message
will depend on the public key algorithm selected between the ClientHello
and the ServerHello. If the client has sent a certificate with signing ability,
a digitally-signed CertificateVerify message is sent to explicitly verify
possession of the private key in the certificate.” [18]
4. Client Change Cipher Spec + Finish: “At this point, a ChangeCipherSpec
message is sent by the client, and the client copies the pending Cipher
Spec into the current Cipher Spec. The client then immediately sends the
finished message under the new algorithms, keys, and secrets.” [18]
5. Server Change Cipher Spec + Finish: “In response, the server will send its
own ChangeCipherSpec message, transfer the pending to the current
Cipher Spec, and send its Finished message under the new Cipher Spec.”
[18]
c. Shared Secret Negotiation
Though technologies and techniques have changed drastically over time, it has 
typically not been difficult to achieve confidentiality as discussed below, especially with 
the aid of modern computers. The greatest challenge has been to devise a method by 
which one can transfer the encrypted material in such a way that it is easy for the 
intended recipient to read but difficult or impossible for an adversary to do so. For 
example, if using AES, one can encrypt a message such that it is computationally 
infeasible to decrypt the message without the key. Then again since AES is a symmetric 
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encryption algorithm, the sender must somehow convey the key to the intended recipient, 
and do so securely. However, herein lays the problem: if the sender already had a secure 
channel to transmit the key, then he would not be seeking another channel. The solution 
to this problem is PKI. 
PKI uses the concept of asymmetric cryptography wherein a message is encrypted 
with one key and decrypted with another. While the details of generic PKI were 
discussed in Chapter II, the assumption going forward is that PKI provides a mechanism 
by which a sender can convey a secret to another party where both sender and receiver 
are guaranteed one another’s identities and eavesdropping by a malicious party is 
impossible. However, this method of communication is extremely computationally 
expensive and becomes infeasible for substantial communication, particularly on 
embedded or mobile devices. 
The specific PKI protocols utilized by TLS are RSA, DH, and Elliptic Curve DH 
(ECDH). Specifically, the key exchange algorithm may be selected from the following 
list for TLS 1.2: RSA, RSA_PSK, DHE_RSA, ECDHE_RSA, DHE_DSS, DH_DSS, 
DH_RSA, ECDH_ECDSA, ECDH_RSA, ECDHE_ECDSA [18]. 
(1) Confidentiality 
Using a symmetric encryption algorithm provides confidentiality. As mentioned 
above, symmetric encryption alone presents many challenges. However, after Secured 
Secret Negotiation to authenticate and open a secure channel between hosts, a symmetric 
key can safely be shared. After exchanging a symmetric key (client and server encryption 
keys derived from the “master secret”), the session can benefit from the performance 
benefit of symmetric encryption. 
TLS 1.2 defined in [18] selects a “Bulk Cipher Algorithm” from RC4, 3DES, or 
AES. However, [24] prohibits the use of RC4 in all TLS versions, [25] adds the ARIA 
cipher suites, and [26] adds the Camellia cipher suites. 
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(2) Integrity 
While Secure Secret Negotiation and confidentiality are critical, and defend 
against a wide array of malicious threats, they are insufficient to guarantee CIA without 
data integrity. To provide integrity, TLS uses two MAC keys, one for when the server is 
sending (server write key) and one for when the client is sending (client write key). The 
MAC keys are derived from the shared master secret. Both server and client are in 
possession of these keys. When a sender is transmitting a message, it first calculates the 
MAC of the message with the appropriate key and then encrypts both the message and 
the MAC. The resultant cipher-text is transmitted to the receiver. 
The receiver decrypts the cipher-text using the appropriate symmetric key. The 
receiver then uses the appropriate MAC key to generate a MAC of the message – if it 
matches the attached MAC, then the message has not been tampered with or corrupted in 
transit. 
The MAC function is either the one specified by the chosen cipher suite and 
applied as described above, or it is implicitly provided by Authenticated Encryption with 
Associated Data (AEAD) cipher mode in which case the client and server write keys are 
unnecessary. The most common implementations of TLS use a MAC from the chosen 
cipher suite and not utilize the AEAD functionality; therefore it will not be expanded 
upon here. The available MAC algorithms for TLS 1.2 are: hmac_md5, hmac_sha1, 
hmac_sha256, hmac_sha384, and hmac_sha512 [18]. 
(3) Authentication 
Though already discussed above, authentication is a critical component of the 
TLS protocol. Without some method of effective authentication, the protocol would be 
subject to man-in-the-middle and other related attacks. The Shared Secret Negotiation 
already provided a mechanism for authentication. Due to the nature of PKI, the client was 
able to deem the server authentic when its messages arrived and were decipherable. That 
is because the message was sent after being encrypted with the server’s private key. 
When the client decrypted the message with the server’s public key, he knew that the 
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server was the only possible sender of the message. The same process works in reverse 
should the server require that the client authenticate using its own certificates. 
(4) Anti-Replay 
A sequence number provides for anti-replay. The sequence number is bundled 
with the message, prior to the application of the MAC. It is a monotonically increasing 
number that, if seen out of order or duplicated, can detect the presence of replay attacks. 
(5) Key Management 
Key management covers several topics, most outside the scope of this paper. The 
aspect of key management most relevant to this thesis is that of the PKI infrastructure. 
While the usage of PKI has been discussed, the distribution of keys has not. The most 
prevalent and robust method by which PKI is employed for TLS is through certificate 
authorities (CAs). When a user goes to a website, for example, which utilized TLS, such 
as a bank, he or she needs assurance that the certificate being presented in fact belongs to 
that institution and not that of an undesired third party. 
It would be unreasonable to expect each institution to manually distribute its 
public keys to all of its customers. Similar challenges exist in most other applications of 
TLS. The current paradigm is to maintain several “root” CAs, such as Verisign or 
Digicert, who conduct varying levels of background investigations to validate the identify 
of an organization or individual. Once they do so, they certify the organization’s 
credentials by issuing them a certificate signed by the root CA’s certificate. Since there is 
a short list of root CAs, the major browser and application makers include the root CA’s 
public keys within the application. When a user is presented with a website’s certificate, 
it needs only check that the signature on its certificate validates against the root CA’s 
public certificate. Thus, the user is assured that the certificate being presented is 
authentic. In most applications, this process is automated until a violation of the protocol 
is encountered. This automation of authenticity is the portion of TLS that provides the 




2. Creating a SSL Socket 
As with digital signatures, java provides code libraries to support secure sockets. 




These imports allow for the creation of a SSL Server Socket Factory, SSL Server 
Socket, and a SSL Socket. The SSL Server Socket Factory is used to initialize the keys 
and certificates for the SSL Server Sockets that are created. The SSL Server Socket 
Factory, when initialized, has the full array of possible algorithms available for securing 
the connection. The initialization is achieved through the command: 
SSLServerSocketFactory sslServerSocketFactory = (SSLServerSocketFactory) 
SSLServerSocketFactory.getDefault(); 
The .getDefault() method for the SSLServerSocketFactory has to access a key 
store that includes the private keys and the trusted members to associate with any SSL 
Server Sockets that are initialized. The private keys are for the SSL Server Sockets and 
the list of trusted members are the public certificates of CAs. The inclusion of the CAs 
allows for the peer authentication trust decisions. Since MAST should only allow for 
communication between its components, the default key store is over written and only the 
private keys and trusted members of MAST are loaded. MAST does this with a system 
call to replace the default key store. 
 System.setProperty(“javax.net.ssl.keyStore,” “MAST_Keystore”); 
System.setProperty(“javax.net.ssl.keyStorePassword,” “abc123”); 
Using sslServerSocketFactory a new SSL Server Socket is created and initialized 
by passing the port on which the SSL Server Socket is to listen and the maximum number 
of clients that the SSL Server Socket should accept. 
sslServerSocket = (SSLServerSocket) 
   sslServerSocketFactory.createServerSocket(listen_port, max_clients); 
48 
As [27] and [28] explain, there are vulnerabilities in some of the algorithms 
inherent to SSL. MAST hardens the SSL Server Socket before it is used. 
hardenSSLServerSocket(sslServerSocket); 
Hardening of the SSL Server Socket via hardenSSLServerSocket allows for 
MAST to remove the vulnerable algorithms from the SSL Server Socket and ensure that 
whenever a connection is made to the SSL Server Socket that no vulnerable algorithms 
are used.  The call hardens the specified SSL Server Socket by disabling weak protocols 
and cipher suites. This is done by requesting supported suites and protocols and then 
disabling those that are prohibited as specified in the static variables for the class. The 
now hardened SSL Server Socket is set to accept incoming connections on the listening 
port provided during creation. 
A client SSL Socket is created similarly to a SSL Server Socket. The calls to 
import the necessary libraries are: 
import javax.net.ssl.SSLSocket; 
import javax.net.ssl.SSLSocketFactory; 
The SSLSocketFactory is initialized using a similar method call as that used for 
the SSLServerSocketFactory and then an SSLSocket can be created from the 
SSLSocketFactory. After creation, the SSLSocket is bound to a port by the operating 
system; the exact port to which the socket is bound is not important since the client is not 
listening for incoming traffic.  
3. Using a SSL Socket
The method of using a SSL Socket is the same as a normal non-secure socket. 
First, a server socket on the server and a socket on the client are created, as described 
above. Since the server socket is bound to a port the client socket must use that port 
number to contact the server.  For the initial connection the server and client will go 
through the hello and handshake to establish a secure connection, as described above. 
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4. DOD RMF Vulnerabilities Addressed through SSL
The creation of a SSL connection encrypts the communication between the 
components of MAST. The SSL session ensures that the two entities communicating are 
in fact the entities that are supposed to be communicating.  With the addition of 
encryption and authentication between server and client, five of the seven CIA-associated 
vulnerabilities identified by [1] as pertaining to MAST are addressed.  As Table 7 shows 
these vulnerabilities are addressed via the use of the SSL connection. The connection 
creates an encrypted pipeline between components. The only way the pipeline is created 
is through the use of PKI that in turn ensures proper authentication of the end points of 
the pipeline. 
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Table 7.   DOD RMF Vulnerabilities Addressed by SSL / TLS, from [1] 
APP3250 High 
The designer will ensure data transmitted through a commercial or wireless network is protected using an appropriate form of cryptography. 
Encryption is not used by the application. 
APP3150 Medium 
The designer will ensure the application uses the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140–2 validated cryptographic modules and random number generator if the application implements encryption, key exchange, digital signature, and hash functionality. 
Encryption is not used by the application. 
APP3170 Medium 
The designer will ensure the application uses encryption to implement key exchange and authenticate endpoints prior to establishing a communication channel for key exchange. 
Encryption is not used by the application. 
APP3260 Medium 
The designer will ensure the application uses mechanisms assuring the integrity of all transmitted information (including labels and security parameters). 
Application does not use any kind of integrity mechanism. 
APP3300 Medium 
The designer will ensure applications requiring server authentication are PK-enabled. 
Application does not have server authentication mechanism. Lack of capability is a finding. A PKI waiver would be required to continue without being PKI enabled. 
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D. SUMMARY 
Chapter III addressed seven vulnerabilities of the total 77 identified by [1]. The 
addressed vulnerabilities all focused on confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-
repudiation. The proposed solutions also address these issues. The use of a SSL 
connection ensures that a secure pipeline is established between components of MAST 
and only intended participants are able to communicate. The addition of digital signatures 
ensures that whatever is received through the pipeline is exactly what is supposed to be in 
the pipeline. Further work is needed to address the remaining 70 open findings from [1]. 
Thirty-five identified issues still remain within the development portion of the findings in 
[1]. Twenty-five out of the 70 outstanding issues are with regard to the deployment of 
MAST, 12 of the 70 pertain to program management, and 10 of the 70 are dealing with 
testing; these remaining issues do not rely on communication between any components of 
MAST and have to do with project management requirements. A major hindrance to the 
proposed solution is the current implementation of MAST.  While a functional work 
around is used, a better solution would be achieved with a restructuring of the current 
MAST implementation. Chapter IV addresses the testing of the proposed solutions. 
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IV. TESTING  
A. ENVIRONMENT PREPARATION 
Below is a description of the environment in which MAST was evaluated and 
exploited to demonstrate inherent vulnerabilities in the current MAST implementation. 
First, a listing of relevant software is provided, followed by the configuration necessary 
to run the virtual environment and conduct the exploit. 
1. The Virtual Environment 
The hypervisor used was VirtualBox version 4.3.26_Ubuntu r98988. Though 
other hypervisors were available, VirtualBox offered the simplest installation and 
configuration, along with a straightforward virtual network configuration. 
 
Figure 10.  Virtual Environment 
The virtual host/hypervisor ran Ubuntu Linux 15.04 as seen in Figure 10. Ubuntu 
Linux was chosen due to the author’s familiarity with the operating system and its ease of 
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setup for this kind of testing. Ubuntu 15.04, specifically, was chosen to leverage the latest 
VirtualBox and Linux Kernel versions to support the hypervisor role. 
The virtual guests ran Ubuntu 14.04.2 as shown in Figure 10. Ubuntu 14.04.2 was 
selected as it is the latest ‘stable’ release of Ubuntu Linux. Although the preponderance 
of DOD end-systems are Microsoft Windows hosts, the relevant MAST components are 
not only written in Java but are also completely operating system independent. Thus, an 
exploit in this environment should be similarly effective when used with any operating 
system. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to verify this similarity; however, replication 
of the test execution using Microsoft operating systems as the guest hosts would allow for 
validating that expectation. 
2. Configuration 
The following sections describe the necessary configuration of the different pieces 
of software used in this project. The descriptions are written assuming a working 
knowledge of basic Linux administration and an understanding of how virtual machines 
work. In all of the following descriptions, a sudo apt-get install on a Debian or Ubuntu 
system, combined with the listed package, should be sufficient to install the required 
software and their dependencies. All other configuration instructions should also work on 
a Debian-based system given the right packages are installed. 
a. The Host/Hypervisor 
The hypervisor ran Ubuntu Desktop 15.04 with Linux Kernel version 3.19.0-21-
generic (SMP) x86_64. The packages required for the hypervisor were: 
ettercap-graphical virtualbox virtualbox-guest-additions-iso wireshark 
Configuring Wireshark properly was nontrivial. The following commands applied 
the appropriate permissions to allow a non-root user to run Wireshark without needing 





$ sudo addgroup wireshark 
$ sudo adduser $USER wireshark 
$ sudo chgrp wireshark /usr/bin/dumpcap 
$ sudo chmod 755 /usr/bin/dumpcap 
$ sudo setcap cap_net_raw,cap_net_admin=eip /usr/bin/dumpcap 
In order to view the traffic necessary for performing this project, a shared virtual 
network was created. The best mode for this network was “Host-Only Network,” 
configurable under File → Preferences → Network → Host-Only Networks. This 
arrangement allowed the host machine to both run the virtual machines and share their 
network, simplifying the execution of the project. The end state connected the 
host/hypervisor and all VM guests to a virtual switch.  
Once the host-only network (referred to hereafter as vboxnet0) was configured, the 
VM guests were created. This was best accomplished by creating one guest virtual 
machine and then cloning it as described in the next section. Most defaults for creating a 
virtual machine were sufficient. Specifically, the first guest was created with one CPU, 
192MB of RAM, and 8GB of storage space. As alluded to above, the network interface 
was configured to use vboxnet0. Though it was not strictly necessary, configuring the 
MAC addresses with easily identifiable values like 00:00:00:00:00:01 simplified traffic 
analysis. 
b. The Guests 
The virtual guests ran Ubuntu Server 14.04.2 with Linux Kernel version 3.13.0-
55-generic x86_64. During installation, the “Minimal VM Guest” option was selected to 
optimize the guests as virtual machines. The packages required for the guests were: 
openjdk-7-jre-headless build-essential 
While the above were all of the required packages, the following packages were 
also installed for convenience: 
tcpdump bash-completion vim acpid openssh-server 
Furthermore, the VirtualBox guest-additions packages were installed on both host 
and guests to facilitate the exchange of files between the host and guest(s), but this step 
was not strictly necessary. 
# Mount the guest iso through host GUI, create a shared folder through the 
# GUI, naming it “share” and then issue the following commands: 
 
$ sudo mount /dev/cdrom /media/cdrom 
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$ cd /media/cdrom/ 
$ sudo ./VboxLinuxAdditions.run 
$ sudo mount -t vboxsf -o uid=$UID,gid=$(id -g) share /mnt 
$ sudo usermod -a -G vboxsf $USER 
$ ln -s /media/sf_share ~/share 
Once the first host was configured, it was cloned rather than having to create and 
configure each new VM individually. Once cloned, the following final steps were taken: 
• Changed the hostname appropriately in both /etc/hosts/ and /etc/hostname
• Reset eth numbering by editing the file /etc/udev/rules.d/70-persistent-net.rules
and deleting the line with the old mac address and then changing eth1 to
eth0.
While the above shared folder steps were not required, the following sections 
assume that it was done with respect to directory names. The alternative was to manually 
copy the required files (listed below) to a directory called /home/$USER/share/[SG|SE|EN], 
with the appropriate module specified at the end. 
This testing was completed using MAST’s SVN repository version 347. The files 
for each MAST component were as follows: SG_347.jar, SE_347.jar, Scenario.txt (with 
the file listed in the paragraphs below), startServer.bat, EN_347.jar, module_list.txt (with 
the file listed in the paragraphs below), and startClient.bat 
The scenario file that the SE had to have in order to complete this testing was 
named drivebydownload.txt and had the following contents (copied from ScanSingleHost.txt): 
[Scenario] 
  Name=Scan Single Host 
  MinClients=1 
[ModuleList] 
  1=NMAP 
[GroupList] 
  1=1 
  2=100% 
  3=0 
[CommandList] 
  1=NMAP --unprivileged 127.0.0.1 
[Events] 
  1=T 4000 SGC 1 1 
The reason for the discrepancy between the file name and file contents was that 
MAST was “hard-coded” to execute the drivebydownload.txt for testing because the 
functionality did not exist to run a scenario from the CLI. 
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The EN had the following contents in the file module_list.txt: 
[module 1] 
name = PING 
exec = ping 
[module 2] 
name = NETSTAT 
exec = netstat 
[module 3] 
name = HPING 
exec = /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/hping3 
[module 4] 
name = returncode 
exec = modules/testExit.sh 
[module 5] 
name = pwd 
exec = pwd 
[module 6] 
name = eicar 
exec = res/modules/eicar.bat 
[module 7] 
name = PORTSCAN 
exec = res/modules/eicar.bat 
[module 8] 
name = JavaTest 
exec = java -jar res/modules/javatest.jar 
[module 8] 
name = DriveByDownload 
exec = java -jar res/modules/DriveByDownload.jar 
[module 9] 
name = NMAP 
exec = /usr/bin/nmap 
[module 10] 
name = WinPcap 
exec = res/modules/installWinPCap.bat 
[module 11] 
name = EmailEicar 
exec = java -jar res/modules/EmailEicarModule.jar 
[module 12] 
name = EmailBatch 
exec = java -jar res/modules/EmailBatchModule.jar 
[module 13] 
name = WriteEicar 
exec = res/modules/WriteEicar.bat 
The emboldened line had been modified to enumerate the directory where the 
nmap binary is located on a Debian system, Debian being the distribution from which 
Ubuntu is derived. This was the only line that needed to be changed, as NMAP was the 
program used by the scenario to be exploited in this project. Again, this modification 
would not be necessary if using MS Windows machines. 
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3. Running the VM Guests 
Running MAST on the guests was a relatively simple process. Though order was 
not critical, for several reasons it was best to run the services beginning with the SG, 
followed by the SE, and finally the EN. Below are the specific commands to launch the 
MAST service on each system. Please note that changing directory to the respective jar 
file was necessary since the MAST program used files in the present working directory, 
where the configuration files detailed above were expected to be found. Note that the IP 
of the SG was 192.168.56.105 and the IP of the SE was 192.168.56.106 and finally the IP 
of the EN was 192.168.56.102. 
a. Running the SG 
The SG is the top node of the network tree and therefore does not need an IP 
address of a server to start the program. 
cd /home/$USER/share/SG/ 
java -jar SG_347.jar 
b. Running the SE 
Since the SE needs to communicate with the SG for updated scenarios and also to 
allow for the SG to start or stop scenarios the IP address of the SG must be provided to 
the SE at start time, along with the port number by which to establish the connection. 
cd /home/$USER/share/SE/ 
java -jar SE_347.jar 192.168.56.105 30001 
c. Running an EN 
The EN is provided the IP address and port of the SE from which it will receive 
commands during the execution of a MAST scenario.  
cd /home/$USER/share/EN/ 
java -jar EN_347.jar 192.168.56.106 30000 
B. EXPLOITATION 
The attempt of the exploit is to stress the host system and consume resources on 
the host network. Ultimately the exploit is showing a proof of concept that MAST is 
vulnerable to attacks. The attack took place between the SE and one EN. A graphical 
representation of the network is depicted in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11.  MAST Sample Network  
1. “The Angle” 
While there are many theoretical exploit ‘vectors,’ only one is needed to 
demonstrate the vulnerability in MAST. It is also important to note that different attack 
vectors have varying levels of practicality. For example, data sent in a TCP stream 
between two Java instances is theoretically trivial to modify ‘in flight’; however, the 
method by which Java bundles the data in the TCP stream makes the arbitrary 
modification of the data impractical. Specifically, the length of a string must be the same 
and cannot contain spaces or certain special characters or Java will drop the packet. 
Further in the chapter a packet is modified “in flight” to change the content while still 
maintaining the proper length.  
While it is possible to programmatically modify Java TCP streams, the 
demonstrated attack instead leveraged the versatility, and therefore rich selection of 
command line arguments, of NMAP to edit strings in flight without changing their 
length. In this way, it was possible to demonstrate vulnerability without implementing a 
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needlessly reusable and versatile exploit. Analogous to the mathematics arena, all that 
was necessary to disprove a statement such as  
“Communication between MAST modules is [always] secure” 
was to simply demonstrate a single counter example in the form of 
“There exists a case in which communication between MAST modules is not 
secure.” 
2. Reconnaissance and “Preparing the Battle-Space” 
Some sort of traffic sniffing was necessary to view the traffic between the MAST 
modules. Though tcpdump could be used on either side, this would have been an 
unrealistic circumstance in practice. Thus, a tool and method was needed to perform 
some sort of Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attack. 
There were many tools and options from which to choose to perform a MitM 
attack, but ettercap and ARP Poisoning were chosen for simplicity and flexibility. As with 
any MitM attack, the goal was to redirect all traffic between two or more hosts through 
the attacker’s machine first, giving the attacker the ability to view and potentially modify 
that traffic. The ARP Poisoning attack accomplished this by poisoning the ARP tables on 
the victim hosts. Specifically, it aimed to replace the MAC address associated with the IP 
address of each victim with the MAC address of the attacker. Thus, all traffic bound for 
the victim machines, at the link layer, went to the attacker instead. The attacker then 
could drop, forward, or modify and forward all traffic between the victim hosts. Figure 




Figure 12.  Correct Network Communication 
To execute the attack, Mallory (the hypervisor) sent a “gratuitous” (unsolicited) 
ARP reply to the SE with the IP address of 192.168.56.102 and the MAC address of 
0a:00:27:00:00:00. Even though this reply was unsolicited, it was accepted nonetheless due 
to the insecure design of the protocol. Though this attack would not have worked in an 
IPv6 environment, there were other MitM attacks available for those circumstances. 
Next, Mallory sent an ARP reply to the EN with the IP address of 192.168.56.106 and the 
MAC address of 0a:00:27:00:00:00. The result was that any traffic between the EN and the 
SE would be sent through Mallory. The resultant network is shown in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13.  Compromised Network Communication 
The command to execute the ARP MitM was: 
sudo ettercap -T -q -M ARP:remote /192.168.56.106// /192.168.56.102// 
Once traffic was flowing through Mallory, analysis of the traffic itself was 
possible by using Wireshark on the vboxnet0 network. At this point, it was clear that the 
data between the modules was transmitted in plain text. After sifting through several 
conversations between the SE and the EN, and realizing that the most vulnerable module 
to attack was one using NMAP, it was decided to focus on the NMAP conversations. 
Using the Wireshark filter ip.src == 192.168.56.106 and ip.dst == 192.168.56.102 and tcp 
contains “NMAP,” all irrelevant conversation was ignored. First, the MAST services were 
started, and then once the normal exchange of traffic had ceased, a capture was 
commenced. In the window of the SE, the command start was issued. As discussed 
earlier, the default module to run was NMAP. The expectation was that some packet 
would initiate at the SE and travel to the EN with the NMAP module indicated and 
appropriate command line options.  The resultant packet can be seen in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14.  Communication between SE and EN 
Highlighted in green are the relevant strings for the desired attack. When 
compared to ScanSingleHost.txt, it is easy to pick out the elements of the command in the 
packet.  
Once the traffic format was identified, it needed only to be replaced by some 
other malicious text. Ettercap had this capability, forgoing the need to find a supporting 
application. Ettercap provided for the use of what it called “filters.” These filters 
performed arbitrary tasks on each packet passing through ettercap before it was 
forwarded. In this case, the task was somewhat simple: identify packets with the string 
NMAP, and in such cases, replace instances of --unprivileged and 127.0.0.1 with new 
arguments demonstrating the weakness of the communications method used by MAST. 
Writing a filter for ettercap was similar to writing a program in a general purpose 
scripting language like Python or Perl. Below is the source code used to create the filter 
for this project, which was named hack.filter: 
1 if (ip.proto == TCP) { 
2     if (search(DATA.data, “NMAP”)) { 
3         replace(“127.0.0.1,” “192.*.*.*”); 
4         replace(“--unprivileged,” “--packet-trace”); 
5         msg(“Got’em!\n”); 




Line (2) searched for any TCP segment that contained ASCII text containing 
NMAP. Any other packet was simply forwarded. Should it find NMAP, line (3) would 
replace any instance of 127.0.0.1 with 192.*.*.* and line (4) would replace any instance of --
unprivileged with --packet-trace. While not necessary for the attack, line (5) notified the 
attacker whenever such actions were executed in order to provide visibility into the 
action. 
The specific goal of this script was to change the console/terminal command: 
$ nmap --unprivileged 127.0.0.1 
to 
$ nmap --packet-trace 192.*.*.* 
The former conducted a simple port scan of the EN (the node which received the 
command). This was an innocuous port scan that would only be visible to or affect the 
EN itself. The latter command would perform a verbose port scan of the entire 192.0.0.0/8 
network! 
3. Execution and Results 
Once the ettercap filter was written, it was compiled into a binary filter file using 
the following command: 
etterfilter hack.filter -o hack.ef 
Upon compilation, the filter could be used in conjunction with any other ettercap 
MitM attack. In this case, it was combined with the same ARP MitM attacked described 
above. The resultant command was: 
sudo ettercap -T -q -F hack.ef -M ARP /192.168.56.106// /192.168.56.102// 
The next step was to ensure all of the VMs were running and that Wireshark was 
capturing traffic across vboxnet0. After issuing the command start in the SE, and applying 
the same Wireshark filter from above, two packets were visible. The first packet was the 
original (and correct NMAP) command packet sent by the SE, destined for the EN – but 
stopped for processing by Mallory. The second packet was the modified version sent to 
the EN by Mallory. Note that the original packet was not received by the intended EN. 
Figure 15 highlights the relevant data in the outbound packet. 
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Figure 15.  Compromised Packet 
Upon receipt, and without having any indication that the instruction was 
malicious, the EN began an intensive scan of the 192.0.0.0/8 network. The EN’s use of 
system resources spiked significantly as it struggled to process the vast scan. 
The selection of 192.0.0.0/8 was specific to the testing environment but could easily 
be tailored to more specific (or broader) needs. Furthermore, this attack could easily be 
extended to conduct this attack on all ENs on a given broadcast domain. Depending on 
the network, ettercap is also capable of attacking any or all hosts on a given subnet! 
Clearly, this attack demonstrates a severe vulnerability with the current implementation. 
The previous exploitation was an attack against communication in the clear and 
demonstrates a vulnerability of MAST without encrypted communication.  The SVN 347 
version of MAST could not be tested for vulnerabilities with regard to file transferring 
between the SG and the SE because at the time of cloning the SVN 347 version that 
functionality did not exist.  The lack of this feature did not allow for testing and therefore 
had to be added with the proposed solution.  The proposed solution addressed digitally 
signing files that were transferred between the SG and SE.   
C. PROPOSED SOLUTION TESTING 
The implementation of the proposed solution is provided in the Appendix. The 
initial setup of the improved MAST is the same as the SVN 347 version and thus will not 
be covered again.  The connections between the SG, SE, and EN are all secured by an 
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SSL connection and therefore encrypted and secure between all nodes of the MAST 
architecture.  The same tests are conducted against the proposed solution as well as 
additional testing for the file transfer and digital signing of the files that are transferred. 
1. Re-attacking Communication 
As referenced before, the communication between the SE and EN is vulnerable to 
a MitM attack.  With the inclusion of SSL for the communication between the SE and 
EN, the MitM attack should be removed from the list of vulnerabilities.  This is 
demonstrated in conducting the same MitM attack as before and finding different results.  
In Figure 16 the packet capture is shown for the MitM attack for the SE and EN however 
now the connection is using SSL and thus the packet data is represented as unintelligible 
ASCII non-printing characters, represented by the printable ASCII character 0x2E (a 
period: “.”). 
 
Figure 16.  SSL Packet Capture 
Not only is the data of each packet sent between the components of MAST 
encrypted, but the use of SSL is also hidden from Mallory as seen in Figure 17.  The 




Figure 17.  SSL Encapsulated in TCP Session 
2. Attacking File Transfer 
MAST had no file transfer functionality in SVN 347; this functionality is added 
with the addition of the proposed solution.  The SG now accesses a scenario from the SG 
scenario folder and sends it along with the signature to the SE.  The SE verifies the files 
as described in Chapter II.  The successful transfer of a file is depicted in the SG output, 
in Figure 18, for sending the file while the SE output, in Figure 19, is the reception and 
successful verification and validation of the file. 
 
Figure 18.  SG File Upload 
 
Figure 19.  SE File Check and Accept 
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Exploitation of the file transfer via a MitM attack is no longer possible due to the 
proposed solution’s utilization of SSL, as discussed before.  However, if an insider 
manipulates a scenario on the SG and sends it to the SE, the SE needs to detect and 
appropriately respond to the file.  In the proposed solution, the method by which it 
detects the unauthorized modification of the file is through the digital signature.  Figure 
20 shows how the SE will display to the user that the file does not verify with its 
signature. 
 
Figure 20.  File Fails to Verify with Signature 
D. SUMMARY 
While testing has not been all-inclusive for the issues addressed in Chapter III, it 
shows that there were vulnerabilities in MAST that could cause real world problems.  
The ability for an attacker to manipulate commands between the SG, SE and EN in such 
a manner could have far-reaching and devastating effects.  If the file transfer had existed 
but the communication was unsecure or the file was not verified before use, an arbitrary 
scenario could have been uploaded to an SE.   
The proposed solution addressed these issues with the addition of SSL and the 
digital signature of file transfers.  This solution is not a panacea for the vulnerabilities 
that are in MAST but this testing shows that the proposed solution provides several 
much-needed layers of security.  The demonstrated attacks were no longer successful 
after the utilization of SSL and digital signatures. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This chapter presents a conclusion of findings of the proposed solution as well as 
identifies areas of future work for MAST. 
A. CONCLUSION OF FINDINGS 
MAST provides an important tool for training and evaluating network 
administrators, as well as users, of the Navy and more importantly the DOD in general.  
A significant hurdle to MAST’s adoption by the DOD community is expected to be the 
certification and accreditation issues raised in [1].  MAST has been incrementally 
developed by many students at NPS over the last few years. While the current 
implementation of MAST demonstrates the value of its approach, from a software 
engineering perspective it lacks in the rigor and structure of commercial products. To be 
deployment ready, MAST should be re-implemented with proper software methodologies 
and Object Oriented Programming (OOP) practices, keeping in mind the C&A issues as 
identified in [1]. As discussed in Chapter III, the current implementation of MAST could 
prevent future developers from improving upon MAST without inescapably rewriting 
substantial portions of the core code. 
This thesis corrects seven key issues with MAST and addresses numerous issues 
related to the implementation, which can be seen in the Appendix.  The proposed 
solutions follow OOP best practices when possible, deviating therefrom only when the 
current architecture and implementation made it impossible.  The issues addressed are 
key to the progression of MAST through another round of DOD RMF, implementing 
vital layers of security. The solution presented herein has implemented encrypted 
communications between all components of MAST, to include communication between 
the SGs and SEs as well as the SEs and ENs; digitally signed file transfers between the 
SGs and SEs. This work has significantly hardened MAST with respect to security by 
ensuring it uses strong encryption, at least one-directional authentication, and limited 
guarantees of data integrity; thus it enhances MAST’s confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, as well as authentication and non-repudiation capabilities. 
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B. FUTURE WORKS 
While reviewing nearly all of MAST’s source code and architecture, multiple 
areas of future work were found.  These areas include: continued work on vulnerabilities 
addressed in [1] and a complete rebuild of MAST using OOP best practices. 
1. Vulnerabilities from DOD RMF 
This thesis addressed seven of the 77 vulnerabilities found in [1].  While most of 
the remaining vulnerabilities lie within the development of MAST, there are still 
vulnerabilities to be addressed from deployment through documentation of MAST.  All 
of the remaining vulnerabilities should be addressed before MAST is subjected to another 
DOD RMF.  A cursory review of the remaining vulnerabilities shows eight outstanding 
“High” threats to MAST in the development portion of the DOD RMF, yet solutions 
could be as easy as assessing the feasibility of such vulnerabilities.  Impractical exploits 
which aim to take advantage of theoretical vulnerabilities pose less of a threat than those 
with are practical to exploit, perhaps even no threat at all. 
2. MAST Rebuild Using OOP 
The purpose and general design of MAST are well thought-out; however, as with 
many research projects that involve students developing the system over a number of 
years, MAST did not follow a product grade software engineering discipline.  For many 
reasons, completely re-implementing MAST’s functionality would be both safer and 
easier than attempting to rectify the noted deficiencies in [1]. Most, if not all, from our 
perspective, concepts of OOP have not been fully enforced in MAST’s development; this 
lends itself to significant complications when trying to improve upon MAST and when 
formally analyzing it. 
To be deployment ready on DOD networks, MAST should be developed by 
experienced software and product engineers using appropriate software methodologies.  
The key stakeholders should be identified and involved from the outset with clearly 
identified requirements and documentation maintained to the greatest degree possible to 
facilitate future development.  Such action would address many, if not most, of the issues 
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remaining to be addressed from [1]. Once a coherent architecture is formalized, any 
number of software development methodologies, such as waterfall or agile, and OOP 
practices should be able to generate a robust, functional, and extensible system with the 
potential to become a game-changer for cyber security training and readiness.  
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APPENDIX.  PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The proposed solutions to the security issues addressed by this thesis are included 
in this appendix.  These do not represent all of the source code of MAST just the portions 
that were edited or added to the program to achieve the hardening of MAST. 
A. DIGITALLY SIGNED FILE TRANSFER 
Uploading the file and the signature via a ServerCommand function is added to 
the ServerCommand class of the SG package also a new class is added to the common 
package; this class is called SignedFile.  SignedFile contains the file name, the file 
content, and the signature of the file.  This allows for MAST to transfer a file and the 
associated signature from the SG to the SE.   
public class SignedFile  { 
 private File    file; 
 private byte[]    content; 
 private byte[]    signature; 
 public SignedFile(File file, byte[] content, byte[] signature) { 
  this.file = file; 
  this.content = content; 
  this.signature = signature; 
 } 
 public File getFile() { 
  return file; 
 } 
 public byte[] getContent() { 
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  return content; 
 } 
 public byte[] getSignature() { 
  return signature; 
 } 
} 
public class ServerCommand extends Command { 
 private static final String SCENARIO_PATH = "SG_scenario"; 
 private static final String SIGNATURE_PATH = "ScenarioSign"; 
 private static final String SIGNATURE_EXT = ".sig"; 
 private SignedFile   signedFile; 
 private int    intPayload; 
 
 public ServerCommand(String name) { 
 
  super(name); 
  intPayload = 0; 
 } 
 public ServerCommand(String name, int intPayload) { 
 
  super(name); 




public ServerCommand(String name, String fileName) { 
  super(name); 
  String filePath = SCENARIO_PATH + File.separator + fileName; 
  String signPath = SIGNATURE_PATH + File.separator + 
fileName + SIGNATURE_EXT; 
  File scenarioFile = new File(filePath); 
  FileInputStream fileInputStream = null; 
  byte[] content = new byte[(int) scenarioFile.length()]; 
  byte[] signature = new byte[384]; 
  FileInputStream sigInputStream = null; 
  try { 
   fileInputStream = new FileInputStream(scenarioFile); 
   for (int i = 0; i < content.length; i++) { 
    content[i] = (byte) fileInputStream.read(); 
   } 
   fileInputStream.close(); 
   sigInputStream = new FileInputStream(signPath); 
   for (int i = 0; i < signature.length; i++) { 
    signature[i] = (byte) sigInputStream.read(); 
   } 
   sigInputStream.close(); 
  } catch (IOException e) { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
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  this.signedFile = new SignedFile(scenarioFile, content, signature); 
 } 
The SE must determine that the client packet contains a file that has to be verified 
and determine if the file can be written to disk or not based on the verification.  This is 
achieved in the ServerCommunicator of the SE by checking the name of the client 
packet. 
public class ServerCommunicator implements Runnable { 
 private Logger  myLogger; 
 private final static int RETRY_TIMES  = 2; 
 private final static int RETRY_DELAY  = 15000; 
 private final static int LOOP_DELAY  = 1000; 
 private final static String PUBLIC_KEY  = "PubKeys" 
+ File.separator + "public.key"; 
 private static final String SCENARIO_PATH = "scenario" + 
File.separator; 
 private Model    model; 
 private ScenarioEngine  scenarioEngine; 
 private boolean   running; 
 private SEServer   seServer; 
 private Connection   connection; 
 
else if ("UPLOAD".equalsIgnoreCase(clientPacket.getName())) { 
 System.out.println("New Scenario recieved..."); 
 SignedFile signedFile = ((SignedFile) clientPacket.getPayload()); 
 FileInputStream keyfis = new FileInputStream(PUBLIC_KEY); 
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 byte[] encKey = new byte[keyfis.available()]; 
 keyfis.read(encKey); 
 keyfis.close(); 
 X509EncodedKeySpec pubKeySpec = new 
X509EncodedKeySpec(encKey); 
 KeyFactory keyFactory = null; 
 
 try { 
    keyFactory = KeyFactory.getInstance("EC"); 
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException e) {  
 System.out.println("Inside Key Factory for Server Communicator: No 
Such Algorithm Exception has been Thrown"); 
      } 
PublicKey pubKey = keyFactory.generatePublic(pubKeySpec); 
byte[] sentSignature = signedFile.getSignature(); 
Signature sig = Signature.getInstance("SHA512withECDSA"); 
sig.initVerify(pubKey); 
sig.update(signedFile.getContent()); 
boolean verify = sig.verify(sentSignature); 
if (verify) { 
System.out.println("signature verifies: " + verify); 
File scenarioFile = signedFile.getFile(); 
String uploadedScenario = SCENARIO_PATH 
scenarioFile.getName().toString(); 
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FileOutputStream output = new FileOutputStream(uploadedScenario); 
output.write(signedFile.getContent()); 
output.close(); 
System.out.println("Scenario was created now to validate format!"); 
ScenarioParser scenarioParser = new ScenarioParser(uploadedScenario); 
File scenarioSEFile = new File (uploadedScenario); 
Scenario scenario = new Scenario(scenarioSEFile); 
      
 scenarioParser.parseScenario(scenario); 
System.out.println("Scenario was in a valid format!"); 
} else { 
System.out.println("signature verifies: " + verify); 
System.out.println("The Scenario file did not check correct.  The signature was 
not verified to be correct!"); 
disconnectFromServer(); 
  } 
 } 
B. SECURE SOCKET LAYER COMMUNICATION 
Any time MAST communicates as a server it uses the SpawnCommunicator class 
in the Common package.  SpawnCommunicator now uses SSL to create a socket for the 
communication and then once the socket is created it is then hardened to remove potential 
vulnerabilities.  The hardening of the socket removes protocols that have known 
vulnverabilities. 
public class SpawnCommunicator<T extends Communicator> implements 
Runnable { 
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private final static String[] PROHIBITED_PROTOS   = { 
"SSLv2Hello", "SSLv3", "TLSv1.1"}; 
 private final static String[] PROHIBITED_SUITE_COMPONENTS
 = { "anon", "DSA", "RC4", "MD5","DES", "NULL"}; 
 private final static boolean EXACT = true; 
 private int     listenPort; 
 private int     maxClients; 
 private SSLServerSocket   sslServerSocket; 
 private boolean    isListening; 
 private ExecutorService   pool; 
 private Model     model; 
 private Executable    server; 
 
 private Class<T>    classTemplate; 
 
 public SpawnCommunicator(int listenPort, int maxClients, Model model, 
Executable server, Class<T> classTemplate) { 
  this.listenPort = listenPort; 
  this.maxClients = maxClients; 
  this.model = model; 
  this.server = server; 
  this.classTemplate = classTemplate; 
  this.pool = Executors.newCachedThreadPool(); 
  this.isListening = true; 
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} 
public void run() { 
try { 
SSLServerSocketFactory sslServerSocketFactory = (SSLServerSocketFactory) 
SSLServerSocketFactory.getDefault(); 
sslServerSocket = (SSLServerSocket) 
sslServerSocketFactory.createServerSocket(listenPort, maxClients); 
hardenSSLServerSocket(sslServerSocket); 
while (this.isListening) { 
SSLSocket sslSocket = (SSLSocket) sslServerSocket.accept(); 
Constructor<T> constructor = 
classTemplate.getDeclaredConstructor(SSLSocket.class, Model.class); 




} catch (SocketException e) { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
   shutdown(0); 
} catch (IOException e) { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
   shutdown(0); 
} catch (SecurityException e) { 
  shutdown(0); 
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} catch (IllegalAccessException e) { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
   shutdown(0); 
} catch (IllegalArgumentException e) { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
   shutdown(0); 
} catch (InvocationTargetException | NoSuchMethodException | 
InstantiationException e) { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 




public void shutdown(int runLevel) { 
 isListening = false; 
 try { 
   sslServerSocket.close(); 
  } catch (IOException e) { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
  pool.shutdown(); 
  server.shutdown(runLevel + 1); 
 } 
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 private void hardenSSLServerSocket(SSLServerSocket sslServerSocket) 
{ 
String[] defaultProtos = sslServerSocket.getSupportedProtocols(); 
String[] allowedProtos = removeInstancesOf(defaultProtos, 
PROHIBITED_PROTOS, EXACT); 
sslServerSocket.setEnabledProtocols(allowedProtos); 
String[] defaultSuites = sslServerSocket.getSupportedCipherSuites(); 




private String[] removeInstancesOf(String[] originals, String[] prohibited_items, 
   boolean exactness) { 
 ArrayList<String> resultsList = new ArrayList<String>(); 
 for (String original : originals) { 
  boolean prohibited = false; 
  for (String prohibited_item : prohibited_items) { 
  if ((exactness != EXACT && original.contains(prohibited_item)) 
   || (exactness == EXACT && 
original.equals(prohibited_item))) { 
  prohibited = true; 
  break; 
 } 
} 
  if (!prohibited) { 
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  resultsList.add(original); 
 } 
} 
 return resultsList.toArray(new String[resultsList.size()]); 
 } 
} 
MAST also needs to communicate as a client and thus uses the 
ConnectionToServer class in the common package.  SSL has been added to the class so 
that any time there is a client communicating with a server it will use SSL. 
public class ConnectionToServer { 
 private final static int SOCKET_TIMEOUT = 1000; 
 private Connection   connection; 
 private boolean   isConnected; 
 public ConnectionToServer(Connection connection) { 
  this.connection = connection; 
  this.isConnected = false; 
  initConnection(); 
 } 
 private void initConnection() { 
  int retryCount = 0; 
  while (retryCount < connection.getRetryTimes()) { 
   try { 
    SSLSocketFactory sslSocketFactory = 
(SSLSocketFactory) SSLSocketFactory.getDefault(); 
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    SSLSocket sslSocket = (SSLSocket) 
sslSocketFactory.createSocket(); 
    sslSocket.bind(null); 
    InetSocketAddress inetSocketAddress = new 
InetSocketAddress(connection.getServerAddress().getHostAddress(),connection.getServe
rPort()); 
    sslSocket.connect(inetSocketAddress, 
SOCKET_TIMEOUT); 
    connection.setSSLSocket(sslSocket); 
    connection.setOut(new 
ObjectOutputStream(connection.getSSLSocket().getOutputStream())); 
    connection.setIn(new 
ObjectInputStream(connection.getSSLSocket().getInputStream())); 
    connection.setLocalAddress((Inet4Address) 
connection.getSSLSocket().getLocalAddress()); 




    for (InterfaceAddress ifaceAddr : 
networkInterface.getInterfaceAddresses()) { 
If (ifaceAddr.getAddress().equals(connection.getLocalAddress())) { 
 String prefix = String.valueOf((ifaceAddr.getNetworkPrefixLength() != 0) 
? ifaceAddr.getNetworkPrefixLength() : 8); 
 String CIDRAddress = connection.getLocalAddress().getHostAddress() + 
"/"+ prefix;     
 System.out.println("ConnectionToServer: CIDR address: " + CIDRAddress 
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        + ", Network 
Address: " + connection.getNetworkAddress()); 
SubnetUtils utils = new SubnetUtils(CIDRAddress); 
SubnetInfo info = utils.getInfo();   
 connection.setNetworkAddress(info.getNetworkAddress()); 
  } 
 } 
 isConnected = true; 
 return; 
   } catch (UnknownHostException e) { 
 connection.getLogger().log(Level.WARNING,"Can't find " + 
connection.getServerAddress()); 
    try { 
  Thread.sleep(connection.getRetryDelay()); 
   } catch (InterruptedException e1) { 
 connection.getLogger().log(Level.WARNING, 
e1.getStackTrace().toString()); 
   } 
  retryCount++; 
   } catch (IOException e) { 
 connection.getLogger().log(Level.WARNING,"Couldn't get I/O for " + 
connection.getServerAddress()); 
    try { 
     Thread.sleep(connection.getRetryDelay()); 
    } catch (InterruptedException e1) { 
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connection.getLogger().log(Level.WARNING, e1.getStackTrace().toString()); 
  } 
    retryCount++; 
   } 
  } 
  connection.getLogger().log(Level.WARNING, 
 "Tried " + connection.getRetryTimes() + " times, giving up"); 
  isConnected = false; 
  return; 
 } 
 public boolean isConnected() { 
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